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Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 25 U.S 245 (1829):
An Early Test of the Dormant Commerce Clause

MICHAEL P. COLLINS, JR.*
On March 20, 1829, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the case of Willson v.
Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co.1 Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court,
affirmed the judgment of the High Court of Errors and Appeals of Delaware and held that the State
of Delaware could enact legislation restricting the free navigation of the Blackbird Creek, located
in New Castle County, Delaware.2 According to the Court, such regulation did not violate Article
I, Section Eight, of the Constitution of the United States which delegates to Congress the exclusive
authority to pass legislation regarding commerce “among the several states.”3 Thompson Wilson,
a sloop operator who could no longer navigate the newly dammed creek, argued that restricting
navigation in the creek limited his right to captain his sloop pursuant to his federal coasting
license.4 The Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. argued that Delaware could enact legislation regarding
the waters located completely within the boundaries of the state.5
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The Court decided Willson nearly 200 years ago. Despite the passage of almost two
centuries and ample opportunity for research and discovery, no legal scholar or historian has
endeavored to explore the facts of the case and the nature of the underlying controversy. Even the
Court’s opinion, occupying a mere eight pages in the reporter, fails to provide a detailed account
of the facts of the case.6 This paper sheds some light on the facts which brought Willson to the
Court.7 Willson represents the Court’s first interpretation of the dormant commerce clause. 8 The
Court’s decision to uphold the Delaware law conflicts, at least to some degree, with the Court’s
decision in Gibbons v. Ogden and subsequent decisions regarding navigable waters.9 Finally, Mr.
Wilson likely did not bring a takings claim against Delaware since the Court would not have
supported such a claim.10
I.

The Case
In 1822, the Delaware House of Representatives passed legislation entitled “An Act to

enable the owners and possessors of the marsh cripple and low grounds, lying upon Black birdcreek in New Castle County, to bank and drain the same.”11 Through this statute, the Delaware
general assembly created the Black Bird Creek Marsh Company.12
A. The Blackbird Creek Marsh Company

6

Id. at 250.
See infra Part I.
8
See infra Part III.A.
9
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See infra Part III.B.
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46, Del. Laws 206 (1822).
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46, Del. Laws § 1 (1822). In the Supreme Court opinion, and in the lower court documents, the marsh company is
sometime referred to as the “Blackbird Creek Marsh Company,” the “Black-Bird Creek Marsh Company,” and the
Black Bird Creek Marsh Company.” The law passed by the Delaware General Assembly refers to the company as
the “Black bird creek marsh company.” The author will refer to the company as either the “marsh company” or the
“Blackbird Creek Marsh Company.”
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Blackbird Creek sits in the southern portion of New Castle County, Delaware. It feeds into
the Delaware River just before the Delaware Bay. Today, the creek extends approximately 16.9
miles and flows from East to West.

Figure 1: Map of New Castle County – 1820 13

13

Roads of Newcastle County. Surveyed and Printed by Henry Heald, 1820 (available at
http://bostonraremaps.com/inventory/antique-map-newcastle-county-delaware-brm2161/).
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The Delaware legislation created the new marsh company in 1822. According to the
enabling legislation, “the owners and possessors of the marsh, cripple, and low grounds lying in
Appoquinimink Hundred, New Castle County,” and “lying upon both sides of Black-bird-creek .
. . shall compose a company to be called ‘The Black bird creek marsh company.’”14 The act
authorized the marsh company to bank Blackbird Creek by “making and constructing a suitable
bank or banks, dam or dams, with the requisite trunks and sluices. . . .”15 The marsh company was
to hold an annual meeting on the first Monday of March and at this meeting, the owners and
possessors of the marsh were to choose, by ballot, a treasurer and three managers for the ensuing
year.16 The act tasked these managers with building and constructing a “good and sufficient dam
across” the creek at such a place as the managers or a majority of the managers found to be
sufficient.17 The dam to be constructed was required to be “at least three feet above the common
tides.”18
The act also appointed three commissioners to view and examine the marsh so that the
marsh company could establish a “valuation or rate of assessment to be observed in assessing and
laying all taxes” under the act.19 In making their assessments, the commissioners were to consider
who among the landowners surrounding the creek would benefit, and to what degree, from the
banking and damming of the creek.20 Once the commissioners submitted their valuations of the
estimated land improvements, cost of constructing the dam would be apportioned according to the
degree which each land owner benefited from its construction.21 If the landowners failed to pay
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Id.
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the annual fee, Delaware could impose interest on the uncollected fee at the rate of fifteen percent
annually until the fee was paid.22 If a landowner still refused to pay, the state could confiscate and
then sell the land in order pay the outstanding fee.23
The act also imposed a penalty for anyone who damaged or otherwise broke, in any
manner, the dams, banks, trunks, or sluices constructed pursuant to the act.24 Likewise, the act also
penalized any effort to “hinder, molest, or disturb, the managers . . . or their workmen while
employed in making or constructing the aforesaid dam, banks, trunks, or sluices . . . .” 25 Each
person convicted under the act could be fined for every offense up to $2,000.00.26 Half of this fee
was to be paid to the marsh company, while the other half was to be paid to the state.27 Essentially,
the act created a private cause of action through which the marsh company could collect
compensation for any damage to the dam.
The final section of the act permits the owners of the land lying above the bank and dam
to keep “flats or scows to transport their lumber, cord wood, grain and other commodities” down
the creek.28 Presumably, the legislature included the right to operate scows as a means of protecting
the landowner’s method of transporting materials along the river even after the marsh company
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46, Del. Laws § 13 (1822).
Id. It remains unclear exactly why Delaware chose to create a company with the purpose of building the dam
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46, Del. Laws § 19 (1822).
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Id.
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46, Del. Laws § 19 (1822).
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differed from a sloop in that it drew significantly less water and therefore could operate in shallower waters.
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had constructed the bank and dam. The act specifically mentions that the landowners shall have
“free egress and regress up and down [Blackbird Creek].”29
B.

Thompson Willson and Others30

Thompson Wilson held a federal license
to carry on the coasting trade in the waters of the
United States.31 According to the lower court
documents, Mr. Wilson was licensed to operate
a sloop called the Sarah.32 He was licensed per
the federal Coasting Act of 1793 which licensed
vessels to carry on trade between the several
states and in the waters of the United States.33
According to the coasting license, Mr. Wilson
was a mariner living in Blackbird, New Castle
County, Delaware.34 Together with Mr. Charles
Smith, also of Blackbird, Mr. Wilson operated
the Sarah, a sloop built at Mantua Creek,
Gloucester County, New Jersey.35 The ship was
built in 1803 and measured forty-eight feet long,
Figure 2: Thompson Wilson's Coasting License
29

46, Del. Laws § 22 (1822).
Although the official record from the Supreme Court and the Court’s opinion spell his name “Thompson Willson”
many of the lower court papers, including his coasting license, spell his name as “Thompson Wilson.” For purposes
of this paper the author will refer to the defendant, and later the appellant, as Thompson Wilson.
31
Answer, Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1824).
32
Id. The Supreme Court would subsequently refer to Thompson Wilson’s ship as the Sally. Willson v. The BlackBird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 246 (1829).
33
An Act for Enrolling and Licensing Ships or Vessels to Be Employed in the Coasting Trade and Fisheries, and for
Regulating the Same, Pub. L. 2-8, Feb. 18, 1793.
34
Answer, Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1824).
35
Id.
30
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sixteen feet wide, drew four and a half feet, and was “flat built.”36 The license authorized Mr.
Wilson to operate the sloop in the coasting trade through March 3, 1824, at which time his license
would require renewal.37
In the lower court documents and pleadings, several other individuals are mentioned as
affiliates of Mr. Wilson. The list of Mr. Wilson’s compatriots is inconsistent and often, the names
are indecipherable. Throughout the litigation—and all the way to the Supreme Court of the United
States—Mr. Wilson is mentioned as the primary litigant.
Mr. Wilson probably depended, in large part, on his coasting license so that he could move
goods, either for himself, or at the request of others. From 1810 to 1820, the population of the
United States expanded by more than 33% to nearly ten million people by 1820. 38 By 1822,
American commerce continued to increase yet there were very few roads. 39 As a result, maritime
commerce remained the most cost effective means of transporting goods throughout the country.40
C.

Breaking the Banks and Dam

On January 27, 1824, the Delaware General Assembly repealed much of the statute
enabling the marsh company to bank and dam Blackbird Creek. 41 The new statute stated that, the
enabling act, which empowered and authorized the owners and possessors of the marsh “to stop
or obstruct the free navigation of the Black-bird creek, be and the same is hereby repealed and

36

Id.
Id.
38
Dep’t of Labor and Workforce Dev., State of New Jersey, United States Resident Population by State: 1790-1850,
http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/lpa/census/1990/poptrd1.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2016).
39
GEORGE R. TAYLOR, THE TRANSPORTATION REVOLUTION: 1815–1860, at 133 (1951).
40
Id.
41
A Supplement to the Act Entitled “An Act to Enable the Owners and Possessors of the Marsh Cripple and Low
Grounds Lying upon Black-bird creek, in Newcastle County, to Bank and Drain the Same.” 48, Del. Laws § 1
(1824). The act fails to mention any reason as to why the legislature sought to repeal the marsh company’s enabling
legislation. Perhaps the land owners surrounding Blackbird Creek grew frustrated with the marsh company’s efforts
or felt that the company profited at the landowners’ expense. At the Supreme Court, Mr. Wilson’s lawyer would
argue that the marsh company existed only for “private emolument.” Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27
U.S. 245, 248 (1829).
37
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declared null and void.”42 The statute still permitted the marsh company to construct a bank or
dam, but not to the extent that such construction would obstruct or stop the creek or injure the
navigation of the same.43 Finally, the amended statute prohibited the imposition of any penalty for
breaking or otherwise damaging a bank or dam which injured the free navigation of Blackbird
Creek.44 Put another way, it was no longer illegal to break or destroy the dam if it prevented free
passage along the creek.
On April 1, 1824, the marsh company filed a complaint in Delaware alleging that
Thompson Wilson and several other men destroyed a portion of the dam at Blackbird Creek. 45
Specifically, the complaint alleged that at some point prior to April 1, 1824 (the date is left blank),
Thompson Wilson and others “with force and arms, to wit, guns, pistols, hatchets, axes, spades,
shovels, mattocks, and other iron instruments . . . did break, damage and destroy the said banks
and dam made of mud gum piles and plank.”46 The marsh company brought an action against
Thompson Wilson for trespass vi et armis—or by force and arms—for the destruction of its
property in Blackbird Creek.47 The marsh company sued for $20,000 in damages—what would be
approximately $500,000.00 in 2016.48
The actual date of the dam’s destruction remains unclear. The lower court papers reveal
that the court issued an order to the sheriff for the arrest of Thompson Wilson and several others
on November 8, 1823.49 If the dam had already been torn out by November 1823, Thompson

42

Id. (emphasis added).
48, Del. Laws § 2 (1824).
44
48, Del. Laws § 3 (1824).
45
Complaint, Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1824).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.; Oregon State University, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors for Years 1774 to Estimated 2026
to Convert to ESTIMATED Dollars of 2016 (2016),
http://liberalarts.oregonstate.edu/sites/liberalarts.oregonstate.edu/files/polisci/faculty-research/sahr/inflationconversion/pdf/cv2016.pdf.
49
Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1823).
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Wilson would have acted long before the marsh company’s enabling legislation had been repealed.
The sheriff took Mr. Wilson into custody, but he would be released by February 19, 1824.50 The
trial court proceeding was scheduled for the March term in 1824.51
At the trial court, James Rogers, the Attorney General of Delaware, represented the marsh
company.52 James Rogers served as the Attorney General of Delaware from 1815 until 1830.53
George Read, Jr. represented Mr. Thompson Wilson.54
D.

The Trial Court and Subsequent Appeals

At the trial court, Mr. Wilson mounted several defenses. First, Mr. Wilson argued that the
place of his alleged trespass, Blackbird Creek, was “a public and common navigable Creek in the
nature of a highway in which the tides and waters . . . have flowed and reflowed.” 55 Essentially,
the marsh company had no right to stop the free navigation of a creek which ebbs and flows with
the tide and is in the nature of a public thoroughfare. Without pulling up the gum piles and planks,
wrongfully placed in the creek, Mr. Wilson and his fellow citizens could no longer freely navigate
Blackbird Creek.56
Second, he argued that the company no longer had any right to stop the free navigation of
Blackbird Creek since Delaware repealed, in large part, the enabling act of the marsh company in
January 1824.57 Specifically, the legislature repealed every provision of the act which had
previously imposed a penalty, fine, or punishment, upon anyone who cut or destroyed any bank,

50

Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1824).
Id.
52
Complaint, Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1824).
53
Delaware Dep’t. of Justice, About the Office, http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/executive/about.shtml (last
visited Nov. 16, 2016).
54
Answer, Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1824). For a more detailed description of Mr. Read,
please see the biographical appendix.
55
Answer, Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1824).
56
Id.
57
Id.
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dam, or obstruction erected across or in Blackbird Creek.58 The mud and gum piles in Blackbird
Creek were wrongfully there since the statute now prohibited any obstruction to the free navigation
of the creek.59 To remove these obstructions, Thompson Wilson removed the mud and gum piles
so that citizens could freely navigate the creek thereafter.60
Third, and finally, Mr. Wilson argued that, since the creek was a navigable and public
highway, the landowners surrounding the creek were entitled to “reasonable wharfage.”61 Even if
the creek was not open to everyone, at least those individuals with land lying along the creek should
be permitted to use the creek for access to their lands62
On April 3, 1824, the trial court heard demurrers from both the marsh company and Mr.
Wilson.63 After hearing the arguments, the trial court found in favor of Mr. Wilson and dismissed
the claims of the marsh company.64 The marsh company appealed immediately.65
On June 20, 1825, the High Court of Errors and Appeals found in favor of the marsh
company.66 The appellate court reviewed the trial court record and reversed and annulled the lower
judgment.67 The appellate court directed the trial court to convict Mr. Wilson of trespass, and to
award damages to the marsh company.68 The appellate court also directed the trial court to conduct
further fact finding regarding the amount of damages to be awarded to the marsh company.69

58

Id.
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
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Id.
63
Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1824).
64
Id.
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Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1825).
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Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
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On November 2, 1825, the trial court impaneled a jury to consider the issue of damages.70
After hearing the evidence presented—and instructions that Thompson Wilson was already found
to have trespassed—the jury awarded damages to the marsh company in the amount of $650.00.71
On December 2, 1825, the court issued an order fieri facias for the collection of the outstanding
damages owed by Thompson Wilson.72 Fieri facias is an order for the sheriff to collect, seize, and
then sell a debtor’s property to satisfy a money judgment. 73 The Sheriff would later write to the
court that only the property of Mr. Wilson could be found and annexed.74
On June 19, 1826, Mr. Wilson appealed to the High Court of Errors and Appeals. 75 He
alleged again that there was no trespass upon the marsh company and that, in the alternative, the
damages awarded by the jury were much greater than properly warranted.76 On June 29, 1826, the
High Court of Errors and Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court with costs to Mr.
Wilson.77 The appellate court did not issue an opinion, and simply affirmed the lower judgment.78
On June 6, 1827, the marsh company received an order to appear before the Supreme Court
of the United States.79 Mr. Wilson decided to take his case all the way to the Court in an effort to

70

Id.
Id. $650.00 in 1825 equals approximately $15,800.00 in 2016. Oregon State University, Consumer Price Index
(CPI) Conversion Factors for Years 1774 to Estimated 2026 to Convert to ESTIMATED Dollars of 2016 (2016),
http://liberalarts.oregonstate.edu/sites/liberalarts.oregonstate.edu/files/polisci/faculty-research/sahr/inflationconversion/pdf/cv2016.pdf.
72
Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1825).
73
Fieri Facias, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); See also 30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions and Enforcement of
Judgments § 14, at 50–51 (1994) (“The writ of ‘fieri facias’ . . . was an early common-law means of enforcing
payment on a judgment; it was, in effect, an order to the sheriff of the court to enforce a judgment against the debtor
by levy, seizure, and sale of his personalty to the extent needed to satisfy a judgment.”).
74
Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1825). As to the other persons involved in the case (which the
author has not mentioned due to their irrelevance to the case at hand) the sheriff wrote that he could not find any of
Mr. Wilson’s co-conspirators, and therefore failed to collect any other property. Id.
75
Thompson Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. (1826).
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Thompson Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. (1827).
71
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affirm his right to freely navigate Blackbird Creek. The Court received the lower court record on
February 13, 1828.80

II.

The Court’s Reasoning

Figure 3: Minutes of the Supreme Court – March 17, 1829

The Court heard arguments in the case of Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Company on
March 17, 1829.81 In Willson, the Supreme Court, via a unanimous decision, affirmed the
judgement of the High Court of Errors and Appeals of Delaware and held that Delaware could
authorize a company to obstruct the free flow of waters completely within the state.82 While Chief
Justice Marshall authored the only opinion in the case, his decision can be divided into two
sections. The first section of the opinion discusses whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the
case.83 The second section of the opinion discusses, in an even shorter analysis than that
accompanying the issue of jurisdiction, the merits of the parties’ claims on the constitutional

80

Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., No. 1506 (1828).
27 U.S. 245, 252 (1829).
82
Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 247–50 (1829).
83
See infra Part III.A.
81
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issue.84 As was customary of Supreme Court opinions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century, the reporter included a summary of the arguments for each of the parties regarding both
the jurisdictional and constitutional issues.85 William Wirt argued on behalf of the marsh
company.86 Richard S. Coxe argued on behalf of Thompson Willson.87
A.

Jurisdiction

Before moving to a decision on the merits—that is, the constitutional issue regarding
whether Delaware could impede the free navigation Blackbird Creek—the Court first considered
whether it had jurisdiction to hear the case.88
1.

The Arguments

On the issue of jurisdiction, Mr. Coxe argued on behalf of Thompson Wilson that the
Supreme Court could hear the case pursuant to section twenty-five of the Judiciary Act of 1789.89
Mr. Coxe argued that the highest court of Delaware, the High Court of Errors and Appeals, had
considered the issue of the act’s constitutionality in rendering its affirmation of the award of
damages from the lower court.90 The only way by which the High court of Errors and Appeals

84

See infra Part III.B.
Willson, 27 U.S. at 247–50.
86
For more information regarding Mr. Wirt, see the biographical appendix.
87
The Supreme Court opinion mentions only that “Mr. Coxe” argued on behalf of Thompson Wilson. According to
the Attorney Rolls of the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr. Richard S. Coxe was admitted to practice before
the Court on February 4, 1823. John D. Coxe was also admitted to practice on August 1, 1791. Given the dates of
each lawyer’s respective admission, it seems likely that Richard S. Coxe served as counsel for Mr. Wilson.
88
Willson, 27 U.S. at 250–51.
89
Id. at 247–48. Section twenty-five of the Judiciary Act of 1789 reads, in relevant part:
That a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or equity of a State in which
a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of,
or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where
is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the
ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the
decision is in favour of such their validity, or where is drawn in question the construction of any
clause of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United States,
and the decision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed by either
party, under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute or commission, may be re-examined
and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error . . . .
Judiciary Act of 1789, Pub. L. 1-20, Sept. 24, 1789, § 25 (emphasis added).
90
Willson, 27 U.S. at 247–48.
85
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could have affirmed the lower court decision would have been to uphold the act authorizing the
marsh company to bank and dam Blackbird Creek.91
Mr. Wirt, arguing on behalf of the marsh company, asserted that the record failed to present
a case in which the Court had jurisdiction.92 The courts of Delaware might have decided for the
marsh company “without sustaining the constitutionality of the act of incorporation . . . .”93 Mr.
Wirt cited the case of Mathews v. Zane for the proposition that the Court should not find
jurisdiction unless the issue of constitutionality arose “inevitably”.94 In actuality, Mathews v. Zane
did not squarely support Mr. Wirt, but did interpret the Judiciary Act of 1789 as subservient to the
jurisdictional restrictions of the Constitution.95
2.

The Decision

Ultimately, Chief Justice Marshall agreed with Mr. Coxe and found that the Court did in
fact have jurisdiction to hear the merits of the claims.96 “Undoubtedly,” he wrote “the plea might
have stated in terms that the act, so far as it authorized a dam across the creek, was repugnant to
the Constitution of the United States . . . .”97 The marsh company relied exclusively on its
legislative authority to build a dam across Blackbird Creek; the marsh company did not argue that
it had a private right to obstruct the creek.98 Since the marsh company did not rely on any other
right, outside of the legislative authorization, the state courts must have considered the

91

Id.
Id. at 249.
93
Id.
94
Id. (citing Mathews v. Zane, 20 U.S. 164 (1822)).
95
Matthews v. Zane, 20 U.S. 164, 206 (1822).
96
Willson, 27 U.S. at 250.
97
Id.
98
Id.
92
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constitutionality of the act.99 The act’s “consistency with, or repugnancy to the constitution of the
United States necessarily arises upon these pleadings, and must have been determined.”100
To be sure, Chief Justice Marshall noted that the Court had decided in favor of jurisdiction
in at least three similar cases. In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, the Supreme Court announced that the
Court could review state court decisions and that federal review could override a state judgment
by virtue of the Supremacy Clause in the Constitution.101 Likewise, in Miller v. Nicholls, the Court
upheld jurisdiction where the facts giving the Court jurisdiction appear on the record or could be
necessarily implied therefrom.102 In Williams v. Norris, the Court found jurisdiction even where
the record did not reveal that the constitutionality of the act was drawn into question.103 All of
these cases allowed Chief Justice Marshall to conclude that it is not necessary to state in terms on
the record “that the constitution or a law of the United States was drawn into question.”104
B.

The Merits

After establishing the Court’s jurisdiction to hear the case, Chief Justice Marshall then
moved to a consideration of the merits.105 Specifically, the Court considered whether Delaware
could pass a statute which infringed the free navigation of a public creek, and whether such a law
would conflict with the Congress’s exclusive authority to regulate commerce between the states.
1.

The Arguments

Mr. Coxe argued on behalf of Thompson Wilson that the act of the Delaware legislature
violated the Constitution and principles of common law.106 The judgement of the High Court of

99

Id.
Id.
101
14 U.S. 304 (1816).
102
17 U.S. 311 (1819).
103
25 U.S. 117 (1827).
104
Willson, 27 U.S. at 251.
105
Id. at 251–52.
106
Id. at 248–49.
100
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Errors and Appeals was erroneous, “because the act . . . so far as the same authorized the company
to shut up and embank across a navigable stream, below the ebb and flow of the tide is repugnant
to the Constitution of the United States . . . .”107 Blackbird Creek is a navigable river and rights to
its navigation belong to all citizens of the United States.108 Furthermore, the right to use a navigable
stream is jus publicum—a right of the public.109 Anticipating or responding to an argument from
Mr. Wirt, Mr. Coxe explained that the enabling act by the Delaware legislature did not aim to
improve the lives of Delawareans, but instead allowed the operators of the marsh company to
enrich themselves through the construction and operation of the dam and bank.110
Mr. Coxe, relied extensively on the Court’s decision in Gibbons v. Ogden.111 Just as the
Court prevented New York from restricting a particular vessel from the waters between New York
and New Jersey, here too, the Court should not allow Delaware to stop the navigation of a creek.112
Thompson Wilson’s sloop was, in fact, licensed to carry on the coasting trade, just as Gibbons was
licensed to operate his steamboat.113 Both Wilson and Gibbons were licensed according to the
Coasting Act of 1793.114 If in Gibbons, New York could not prohibit the exercise of a right granted
by a federal license, here too, Delaware could not prohibit the free navigation of Blackbird
Creek.115
Mr. Coxe also argued that the act of the legislature, in 1824, repealed the incorporating
legislation and prohibited the marsh company from constructing any obstruction in Blackbird
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Creek.116 The repeal of the enabling act could have presented the Court with an opportunity to find
that, regardless of the constitutional issue in the case, the marsh company no longer had statutory
authority to bank or dam the creek.117 Rather than considering this issue, Chief Justice Marshall
omitted all argument with regard to the act’s repeal and did not discuss the issue further.118
Mr. Wirt admitted that Blackbird Creek is navigable and in the nature of a public
highway.119 Despite the navigability and public nature of Blackbird Creek, it rests entirely within
the boundaries of the state of Delaware.120 How could the Court hold that a state lacked the
constitutional authority to regulate subjects entirely within its geographic boundaries? Surely, Mr.
Wirt argued, it “cannot be urged that the power to regulate commerce can interfere with the rights
of the states over the property within their boundaries.”121 He emphasized that Delaware had
merely exercised its state police powers: “While the waters of the United States belong to the
whole people of the nation, this creek continued subject to the power of the state in whose territory
it rises.”122 He went to great lengths to explain that Blackbird Creek is “one of those sluggish
reptile streams” which “spreads its venom and destroys the health of all those who inhabit its
marshes.”123
The power to regulate commerce pursuant to Article One, Section Eight of the constitution
could not be construed to interfere, to such a great extent, with state police powers.124 Furthermore,
if it could be so construed, there was no federal right with which the Delaware law interfered.125
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Put another way, despite the fact that Mr. Wilson was licensed to carry on the coasting trade by a
federal statute, Mr. Wirt argued that there had been no legislation by Congress with which the
Delaware legislation interfered.126
2.

The Decision

Having established that the Court could hear the case, and considering the arguments of
the litigants, Chief Justice Marshall turned to “the more doubtful question” of “whether the act
incorporating the Black Bird Creek Marsh Company is repugnant to the Constitution, so far as it
authorizes a dam across the creek.”127 Chief Justice Marshall found some merit in Mr. Wirt’s
argument regarding the negative impacts of Blackbird Creek prior to the legislature’s passage of
the enabling act.128 He explained “this is one of those many creeks, passing through a deep level
marsh adjoining the Delaware, up which the tide flows for some distance.”129 He agreed that the
value of the property along the banks of Blackbird Creek must have been enhanced by draining
the same.130 He also noted that the lives and health of those who reside beside and near the creek
were probably improved greatly.131
Even if the act of the Delaware legislature vastly increased the value of property situated
along the creek and improved the lives of the Delawareans living there, the act would still be
unconstitutional if it interfered with a federal statute or right. 132 At this point, Mr. Wilson might
have thought the he was about to prevail in the case and succeed in overturning the decision of the
High Court of Errors and Appeals. Alas, his hopes were dashed when Chief Justice Marshall went
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on to explain that Delaware interfered with no such right.133 Mr. Wilson’s argument regarding the
Delaware law rested entirely on its “repugnancy to the power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several states.”134 Such an objection could only be valid if Congress had
taken some kind of legislative action regarding Blackbird Creek.135 According to the Court,
Congress had passed no legislation regarding the creek and therefore Delaware was completely
within its right to take legislative action regarding its improvement.136 Chief Justice Marshall cited
no precedent to support his holding regarding the commerce clause holding. He closed the opinion
by summarizing, “We do not think that the act empowering the [marsh company] to place a dam
across the creek, can . . . be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its
dormant state, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the subject.”137
The Court held that there was no error and affirmed the judgment of the High Court of
Errors and Appeals with costs.138
IV.

Analysis
Article I, Section Eight, of the Constitution empowers Congress to “regulate commerce

with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes . . . .”139 In Gibbons
v. Ogden, the Court determined that Congress had exclusive authority to regulate commerce
between the states.140 Willson represents the first decision to interpret what has since been
recognized as the dormant commerce clause.141 In addition, the jurisprudence of the early
nineteenth century indicates that the Congress possessed the exclusive power to regulate all
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navigable waters in the United States.142 In this context, Willson represents a decision inconsistent
with the Court’s later cases which would hold that Congress possessed exclusive regulatory power
in navigable waterways.143
Aside from a commerce clause challenge, one might ask why Thompson Wilson did not
argue, at any stage in the litigation, that the Delaware legislation amounted to a taking of his
coasting license. The answer to this question lies in the fact that, at the time, the Court had decided
very few cases regarding the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. The Court’s decision in Barron
v. Baltimore, which came after Willson, held the Fifth Amendment applied only to the federal
government—meaning that citizens could not assert a Fifth Amendment takings claim against a
state government. The lack of Supreme Court precedent regarding takings, and the generally
accepted belief that the rights protected in the Bill of Rights applied only to the national
government, and not the individual states, likely dissuaded Mr. Wilson’s lawyers from claiming a
taking.144 Even if Mr. Wilson brought a takings claim according to modern jurisprudence, his claim
would still fail since the value of his coasting license was not completely eliminated by the
Delaware law.145
A.

The Court Applied the Dormant Commerce Clause While Ignoring the Navigability

of Blackbird Creek.
In response to one of the several failures of the Articles of Confederation, many of the
delegates of the Constitutional Convention recognized the need for the federal Congress to regulate
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commerce not only with foreign nations, but also between the several states.146 For this reason, the
new federal Constitution empowered Congress to pass laws regarding trade between the states. 147
In the seminal case of Gibbons v. Ogden, the Court struck down a New York law which
granted an exclusive steamboat monopoly in the waters between New York and New Jersey.148 In
1809, New York granted Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton exclusive authority to operate
steamboats in the waters of New York for twenty years.149 Aaron Ogden eventually obtained the
rights to the monopoly and attempted to enforce the state-created monopoly against his former
business partner, Thomas Gibbons.150 Ultimately, the Court decided that New York could not
create such a monopoly on the steamboat business in New York waters.151 Specifically, the Court
held that “commerce”, as used in Article I, Section Eight, included navigation of waterways.152
Congress, according to Chief Justice Marshall, had the exclusive authority to regulate commerce
between the states.153 In his explanation of the commerce power granted to Congress in Article I,
Section Eight, Chief Justice Marshall wrote one sentence which made Gibbons the first case to
recognize the dormant commerce clause:
The grant [of the power to regulate commerce] does not convey power
which might be beneficial to the grantor, if retained by himself, or which
can enure solely to the benefit of the grantee; but is an investment of power
for the general advantage, in the hands of agents selected for that purpose;
which power can never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be
placed in the hands of agents, or lie dormant.154
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In this way, Chief Justice Marshall explained that the exclusive power of Congress to regulate
commerce between the states necessarily implied that the states themselves did not possess power
to regulate, and therefore impede commerce between the states.155

Figure 4: The Port of New York156
In Willson, Chief Justice Marshall recognized that Thompson Wilson challenged the
Delaware law as a violation of the dormant commerce clause. For this reason, in an already very
short opinion, the Chief Justice explained that the Court’s decision did not offend the dormant
commerce clause:
We do not think that the [Delaware] act empowering the Black Bird Creek
Marsh Company to place a dam across the creek, can, under all the
circumstances of the case, be considered as repugnant to the power to
regulate commerce in its dormant state, or as being in conflict with any law
passed on the subject.157
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According to the Court, the marsh company’s enabling act was not an awakening of the dormant
commerce clause which would have caused the state action to conflict with the exclusive authority
of Congress. Following the Court’s decision in Gibbons, the decision in Willson might have come
as a surprise. In Gibbons, the Court struck down a state regulation which impeded the free flow of
navigation and therefore commerce. Yet, in Willson, the Court found no problem with a state
regulation which prohibited Thompson Wilson from navigating Blackbird Creek. Thompson
Wilson and Thomas Gibbons both challenged the state restrictions on the basis that the restrictions
conflict with the rights granted to them by the Coasting Act. Rather the considering the issue of
the coasting license, Chief Justice Marshall flatly ignored the issue.158
Gibbons and Willson were different in at least two ways which might explain the
divergence in outcomes. First, the regulation in Gibbons was purely of a commercial nature.159
New York sought to exclude all other steamboat operators for the economic advantage of the
state’s exclusive licensee.160 In Willson though, the Delaware legislature allegedly aimed to bank
or dam Blackbird Creek to improve the lives of the citizens living nearby.161 Second, the port of
New York (at issue in Gibbons), it can be safely assumed, was far busier and hosted many more
vessels than Blackbird Creek. These two factors, the economic nature of the legislation, and the
nature of the waterways involved, have been offered as possible differentiations which might
explain why the Court inconsistently decided Gibbons and Willson.162
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After Willson, the Court cited the case to uphold state regulations which could have been
viewed as impediments to commerce between the states. For example, in Cooley v. Board of
Wardens of Philadelphia, the Court upheld a Pennsylvania law which required all ships entering
the port of Philadelphia to hire a local pilot for the vessel.163 The Court held that the law did not
infringe upon the authority granted to Congress since Congress, although having authority to pass
laws concerning pilotage, had not passed a law regarding pilotage in Philadelphia.164 Pennsylvania
did not offend the Constitution since Congress was silent on the subject.165 The Court cited Willson
for the proposition that in the absence of congressional legislation, states may act to regulate
commerce.166 Today, Willson has yet to be expressly overturned or questioned by any Supreme
Court decision.
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Willson further conflicts with the Court’s subsequent decisions regarding state regulations
which impede the navigation of rivers. After Willson, the Court routinely held that Congress
possessed the sole authority to regulate the navigable waters of the United States.168 The Court
clearly stated in Gilman and Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. that Congress had the exclusive
authority to pass all laws regarding the navigation of the waters of the United States. If Blackbird
Creek was a navigable river, this would seem to render Willson inconsistent with these later cases.
In this sense, Gilman and Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. at least partially overruled, sub silento,
the rationale employed by the Court in Willson.
B.

The Delaware Legislation Did not Constitute a Taking in 1829, or Today.

In 1824, at least one Delaware representative, in advocating for the repeal of the marsh
company’s enabling legislation, argued that the legislation, amounted to a taking in that it
prohibited the free navigation of Blackbird Creek.169 More specifically, the opponent argued that
Mr. Wilson and others like him, previously had a right to travel up and down Blackbird Creek. 170
Now, with the passage of the enabling act and the subsequent construction of the banks and dam,
Mr. Wilson had suffered a form of taking—his coasting was now worth considerably less since he
could not navigate the creek.171
Since at least one representative argued that the regulation, preventing the free navigation
of Blackbird creek amounted to a taking, one might ask why Mr. Wilson did not bring such a claim
when he sued the marsh company. Mr. Wilson likely did not bring a takings claim since the Court
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had not yet applied the Fifth Amendment to the states.172 Specifically, the rights enumerated in the
Bill of Rights applied, according to the Court at that time, only to the federal government.173 In
1833, the Court heard the case of Barron v. Baltimore.174 In Barron, the Court considered whether
a wharf owner could bring a takings claim, under the Fifth Amendment, against Baltimore and
Maryland after the wharf’s value was reduced as a result of a municipal plan to improve drainage
in Baltimore.175 The Court held that the Fifth Amendment applies only to actions by the federal
government.176 Chief Justice Marshall explained that the states could pass their own constitutional
measures requiring just compensation after a taking.177 The federal Constitution imposed the
requirement of just compensation upon the federal government alone.178 The Fifth Amendment
would not be applied to the states until the end of the nineteenth century. 179 Quite simply, Mr.
Wilson’s lawyers likely believed that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to state actions which
would therefore prohibit Mr. Wilson’s claim from succeeding.
Even today, the Delaware legislation would not amount to a taking which requires just
compensation pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.180 In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co.
v. City of Chicago,181 the Court incorporated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment into the
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and required states to provide just
compensation after seizing private property for public use.182 According to the Court’s modern
taking’s jurisprudence, a regulatory taking occurs when some form of government action, not
necessarily the exercise of eminent domain authority, significantly reduces property rights.183
Under the modern doctrine, Mr. Wilson would have a significantly better chance of challenging
the Delaware legislation, but his takings claims would still fail since the value of his coasting
license was not reduced to zero.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,
form the bedrock of American takings jurisprudence.184 Essentially, these decisions, both of which
relate to land, require that states must compensate property owners after the passage of regulations
of a certain character.185 While states possess the power to regulate property, when a regulation
“goes too far,” the regulation amounts to a taking which entitles the property owner to just
compensation.186
For example, in Mahon, the Court held that a Pennsylvania regulation amounted to a taking
for the owners of coal mines.187 The statute at issue prohibited coal companies from mining the
coal columns left in mines to prevent mine collapses.188 Not only did these columns prevent the
collapse of the mines, but it also prevented the land above the mine, which was often developed
with residential or commercial property, from collapsing into the ground.189 The Court held that,
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since the statute eliminated any interest in the columns, which the coal companies previously held,
the regulation amounted to a taking.190 In Mahon, the Court held that the regulation “went too far,”
and therefore worked a taking on the owners of the coal mine.191
In Penn Central, the Court upheld New York’s efforts to protect historical buildings in
New York City.192 The regulation created a system which prohibited certain property owners from
further developing properties, but enabled them to transfer these development rights to neighboring
properties.193 The Court held that the regulation did not amount to a taking since the development
rights were not abrogated, but simply made transferrable.194
If the Court were to apply Mahon to Mr. Wilson’s case, it would likely find that, unlike the
coal owners in Mahon, Mr. Wilson did not suffer a complete taking of any property. In Mahon,
the court focused on the fact that the regulation amounted to a complete restriction on the mining
of the coal columns, making them essentially worthless.195 But, Mr. Wilson did not suffer a
complete taking of his coasting license. Unlike the coal companies, who could not mine any more
of their coal, Mr. Wilson could still operate his coasting vessel anywhere in the United States, with
the exception of the Blackbird Creek. Just as the landowners in Penn Central could transfer
development rights, Mr. Wilson could navigate in any other waterway in the United States.196
Therefore, the Court would not find that the Delaware regulation “went too far” by working a
taking on Mr. Wilson.
IV.

Conclusion
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In Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., the Supreme Court held that a Delaware law
permitting the construction of a dam along Blackbird Creek in New Castle, Delaware did not
conflict with the exclusive power of Congress to regulate commerce and therefore, navigation
between the states.197 Willson represents the Court’s first interpretation of the dormant commerce
clause.198 While the facts of Willson might seem similar to the facts of Gibbons v. Ogden,199 Chief
Justice Marshall likely reached a different conclusion in Willson due to the economic and
geographic differences of the two cases.200 Additionally, the Court’s decision would later conflict
with subsequent cases concerning navigation of the waters of the United States, and the exclusive
authority of Congress to regulate such waters.201 Finally, Mr. Wilson likely chose not to bring a
takings claim—alleging a reduction in the value of his coasting license—since the jurisprudence
of the time would not have supported such a claim.202 Even today, Mr. Wilson did not suffer a
taking as a result of the Delaware law.203
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Appendix I: George Read, Jr. – A Biographical Sketch

Figure 6: George Read, I204

Figure 7: George Read, Jr.205

George Read, Jr. was born in New Castle County, Delaware to George and Gertrude (Ross)
Read in 1765.206 He studied law with his father, George Read, and ultimately became a powerful
and respected jurist in Delaware.207 George Read signed the Declaration of Independence and
penned a letter to King George III, while serving as Attorney General of Delaware, scolding the
King for taxing the colonists while not allowing them representation in Parliament. 208 Read also
assisted in framing the United States Constitution, advocated for its ratification in Delaware, and
ultimately signed the Constitution in 1789.209
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On October 30, 1786, George Read, Jr. married his first cousin, Mary Thompson.210 He
served as the first United States Attorney for the District of Delaware from 1789 until his
resignation in 1816.211 Upon his resignation in 1816, his son, George Read, III served as the next
United States attorney.212 In 1820, Attorney General William Wirt requested that George Read,
along with fellow Delawarean Caesar Rodney, prepare a report regarding a disputed island in the
Delaware River.213 Along with Caesar Rodney, George Read offered his opinion regarding the
history of an island in the Delaware River known as the Pea Patch.214 Perhaps Thompson Wilson
felt George Read was uniquely qualified to assist in his case since George Read likely handled
several issues involving property rights and even constitutional questions upon leaving his post as
U.S. Attorney in 1816.
Beginning in 1797, George Read began construction of a grand mansion and garden in
New Castle, Delaware.215 Construction of the house finished in 1803.216 The house is 14,000
square feet and has twenty-two rooms.217 In 1824, a large fire destroyed much of the Read House,
but before his death in 1836, George Read, Jr. purchased land adjoining the property which allowed
for the expansion of the Read House & Gardens.218 Today, the house is a historical site in Delaware
and welcomes visitors every year.219
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Figure 8: Read House220
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Appendix II: William Wirt – A Biographical Sketch

Figure 9: William Wirt221

William Wirt was the ninth United States Attorney General.222 Wirt served in this capacity
from November 13, 1817 until March 4, 1829.223
Wirt was born in Bladensburg, Maryland on November 8, 1772. 224 In 1807,
President Thomas Jefferson appointed him to prosecute Aaron Burr for charges of treason.225
Later, in 1817, President James Monroe appointed Wirt Attorney General. While serving as
Attorney General, Wirt argued many cases before the Supreme Court, to include McCulloch v.
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Maryland226 and Gibbons v. Ogden.227 William Wirt also served as the Supreme Court counsel for
the marsh company in 1829. Recognized as one of the greatest lawyers to ever appear before the
Court, Wirt dedicated his life to his work.228
In Gibbons, Wirt argued on behalf of Thomas Gibbons.229 Thomas Gibbons, as previously
discussed, sought to prevent the enforcement of the steamboat monopoly granted by New York to
his former business partner, Aaron Ogden.230 Mr. Wirt’s argument in the case was spectacular:
Those who have witnessed Mr. Wirt’s oratorical efforts, will testify
to the difficulty of ever furnishing an exact report, even by himself,
of the finest passages in which his taste often led him to indulge. He
was in the habit often of turning aside from the direct path of
argument, to amuse himself and his hearers with an occasional
gambol of wit or fancy, which came with most graceful playfulness
to relieve the stress and weariness of mere dialects.231

In would appear somewhat inconsistent for Mr. Wirt to argue on behalf of a mariner trying
to escape the grip of a state regulation (Gibbons) while later arguing on behalf a company hoping
to enforce a state law (the marsh company). Wirt’s ability to prevail in each case, achieving a
victory for both Ogden and the marsh company, is a lasting testament to his ability to persuade the
learned justices of the Supreme Court, and especially Chief Justice John Marshall.
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